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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Lessons Learned

HEADQUARTERS

2D BATTALION (175MM) (SP)

32D ARTILLERY

AFPO San Francisco 96353

[u] (S)

1 August 1966

AVGE-ZC

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Jul 1966.  
Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (U)

THRU:

Commanding Officer  
23d Artillery Group  
ATTN: AVGE-C  
APO 96289

Commanding General  
II Field Force Vietnam Artillery  
ATTN: AVFB-FA-C  
APO 96227

Commanding General  
United States Army Vietnam  
ATTN: AVC-DH  
APO 96307

Commander - in - Chief  
United States Army Pacific  
ATTN: GPOP-MH  
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development  
Department of the Army  
Washington, D.C. 20310

SECTION 1

1. (C) Significant Organization or Unit Activities:
  - a. Personnel

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
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(1) General: Normal S1 Activities have been conducted since the last Operational Report. As regards replacement programming it should be pointed out that by 65 days prior to DEROS, all officers, SGM, all but one (1) E-8, and three (3) E-7's replacements had been named. In the grades of E-5 and E-6 about 10% have been named.

(2) Strengths:

(a) Authorized and assigned strength for the period ending July 1966:

	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>			<u>ASSIGNED</u>		
BATTERY	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM
HQ	15	1	127	18*	1	139
A	5	0	104	4	0	113
B	5	0	104	6	0	117
C	5	0	104	6	0	112
SVC	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>79</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>84</u>
TOTAL	32	4	518	36	5	565

\* Includes one additional pilot authorized by the 23d Arty Gp.

(b) Gains during the period included:

<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>
12	1	103

(c) Losses during the period included:

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<u>TYPE</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>
BTS	3	0	32
KIA	0	0	0
DIED OF WOUNDS	0	0	1
WIA	0	0	9
MISSING IN ACTION	0	0	0
NON-BATTLE DEATHS	0	0	0
NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES	1	0	5

(3) Morale: The morale of the command is excellent.

(4) R & R Program: The following out of country R & R's have been used by this battalion.

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>	<u>JULY</u>
Bangkok	12	6	12
Hong Kong	6	6	4
Kuala Lumpur	0	0	3
Manila	2	0	2
Penang	0	0	1
Singapore	0	4	3
Taipei	4	8	9
Tokyo	<u>7</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>9</u>
	31	32	43

(5) Decorations and Awards:

(a) One Legion of Merit has been awarded.

(b) Six Bronze Star Medals have been awarded.

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- (c) Eleven Air Medals have been awarded.
- (d) Ten Purple Hearts have been awarded.
- (e) Fifteen Bronze Star Medals are pending.
- (f) Eleven Air Medals are pending.
- (g) Twenty Army Commendation Medals are pending.

(6) Mail: The Battalion Mail Clerk picks up mail at APO 96353 and sorts it by battery. Mail for Headquarters, "C", and Service Batteries is then picked up by the respective Mail Clerks. Mail for Battery "A" (Xuan Loc) is returned to APO 96353 and delivered through postal channels to the battery at APO 96257. Mail for Battery "B" (Lai Khe) is returned to APO 96353 and delivered through postal channels to Unit #3, APO 96345 where the unit picks it up.

(7) Religious Services: Batteries "A" and "B" attend services with units in their areas. Headquarters, "C", and Service Batteries attend regularly scheduled services in the Battalion CP Area conducted by chaplains from the 25th Infantry Division. In addition, a 23d Artillery Group Chaplain visits each battery weekly.

(8) Medical: 5 personnel have been evacuated out of country (Three were non-battle casualties).

(9) Discipline, Law, and Order: Judicial and non-judicial actions by batteries included:

<u>BATTERY</u>	<u>ARTICLE 15</u>	<u>SUMMARY COURT</u>	<u>SPECIAL COURT</u>	<u>GENERAL COURT</u>
HQ	7	0	0	0
A	2	0	0	0

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<u>BATTERY</u>	<u>ARTICLE 15</u>	<u>SUMMARY COURT</u>	<u>SPECIAL COURT</u>	<u>GENERAL COURT</u>
B	21	0	0	0
0	19	0	1	0
SVC	<u>7</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
	56	0	1	0

(10) Safety: Recordable accidents by batteries were as

follows:

<u>BATTERY</u>	<u>VEHICLE</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>
HQ	1	3
A	0	2
B	0	1
C	0	0
SVC	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>
	3	7

(11) Education: Personnel are using USAFI and Army

Extension Courses. Participation by batteries was as follows: :

<u>BATTERY</u>	<u>PARTICIPANTS</u>
HQ	5
A	0
B	2
C	1
SVC	<u>0</u>
TOTAL	8

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## (2) Problem Areas:

(a) Mail and Distribution: Because of the location of the batteries, the time to move mail and distribution from the battalion to the batteries and vice versa is excessive. The non-dependability of organic and other aircraft schedules has also been a contributing factor.

(b) Movement of Replacements: The movement of replacements between units is difficult and often results in personnel not being moved as promptly as they should. The 23d Artillery Group has been most cooperative, however the replacements going to La Linea and Xuan Loc have posed problems.

## b. Intelligence

### (a) Administration

(1) During the reporting period, this section has encountered no major obstacles. An intelligence situation map is maintained in the section and is kept posted. Information is obtained from current Intelligence Reviews, INSUMS, Bulletins and PERINTREPS. In addition battalion observers, pilots and Liaison Officers are debriefed for intelligence information upon the completion of each mission.

(b) An inspection of the Intelligence Section was conducted by 23d Artillery Group on 7 June 1966. A complete inventory of the classified material was completed along with a check of the section's filing system, logging and other security measures. No discrepancies were found and the section received a rating of excellent.

(2) Aerial Surveillance: The battalion continues to

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operate with one H-13 and two O1D aircraft. On 10 July 1966, the two O1D aircraft were taken from their operational base at Duc Hoa (Hq, 25th ARVN Div) and brought to Cu Chi after 25th (US) Infantry Division's Fixed Wing Strip was opened. Daily visual reconnaissance flights continue with a goal of six hours of observation per day. Daily visual reports are submitted to 23d Artillery Group covering significant sightings and fire missions. Total hours of visual reconnaissance flown during the reporting period:

<u>TYPE AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>	<u>JULY</u>
F-43	10	15	0 (down for repair parts entire month)
O1D (925)	52	35	35
O1D (963)	40	35	37

(3) Survey: Survey requirements during the reporting period were limited; however, position area and directional survey was established in the Xuan Loc position prior to Battery "A's" occupation.

#### (4) Problem Areas:

(a) The lack of timely intelligence information means few opportunities arise for artillery units to engage lucrative targets.

(b) Target acquisition in the jungle environment for heavy artillery still remains a major problem.

#### c. Training and Organization

(1) General: Training emphasis was placed primarily on subjects for replacements; however, refresher training was conducted for all personnel.

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Many common subjects were discussed but perimeter defense, convoy security, motor maintenance, new series radios and fire direction training received the greatest emphasis. These subjects were emphasized because of the number of operations participated in by the battalion, frequency and duration of the operations and the distances travelled to reach the operational areas.

(2) To insure an adequate training program within the battalion, a program of required subjects, totalling 40 hours of instruction, will be given to all personnel on a quarterly basis. Instruction will cover a diversity of subjects and will be in addition to the common subjects being conducted at the present time.

(3) Maintenance and upkeep of generators was noted as a problem in previous Commander's Reports. To minimize operators contributing to these problems, 14 personnel from the battalion attended a Generator Operator's Course at 725th Maintenance Battalion, 25th Infantry Division during the months of May and June 1966. The 25th Infantry Division has expanded the list of schools available and quotas have been requested on FM Radio Security Equipment, Small Arms Inspection, Military Justice, Mess Management, Explosives and Demolitions and Motor Maintenance.

d. Operations:

(1) The position of the battalion at the beginning of the reporting period was as follows:

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<u>BATTERY</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
HQ	Cu Chi (XT644148)
A	Bear Cat (YS145984) (2 M107's)
B	Lai Khe (XT758371) (4-M107's)
S	Cu Chi (XT645147) (4-M110's)
SVC	Tan Son Nhut (XS797964)

(2) On 1 May 1966 an alert order was received to prepare for attachment of "A" Battery, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery (8") on 4 May and on 6 May attach that battery plus "A" and "C" Batteries to 6th Battalion, 6th Artillery in vicinity of Tay Ninh (XT2851) for Operation BIRMINGHAM. Our "A" Battery closed into Cu Chi 3 May from Bear Cat without incident. A thorough reconnaissance was accomplished by the Battalion Commander with the Battery Commanders on 4 and 5 May and on 6 May the convoy departed. The wheeled vehicles under the control of the Battalion Executive Officer was air covered by S-3 (01D) along route 1 and 22 to Tay Ninh. The tracked vehicles, under the control of "A" Battery's Commander, was air covered by the Battalion Commander (H-13) along Route 1 to Bo Dau Ha (XT386251), north to Boa Don (XT432353) and west into Tay Ninh. Attachment was effected 061630hrs May. During the operation the two 8" batteries occupied positions at XT288634, XT340578, XT385429, XT475465 and XT370422. The main problem area was soft ground. The M110's stuck to an excessive depth during H & I firing (after each 5 rounds). Five ton trucks invariably were mired once they left the main roads. It was decided to move ammunition with APC's and ammunition trailers.

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during future operations in similiar terrain. The 175mm battery occupied positions at XT335575, XT167530 and XT370422. At the second position, 175mm gun tubes had to be changed after reaching the then current restriction of 400 total rounds. In moving to the second position, it was proven that the 12 ton bridge in Tay Ninh City would hold the M107 (32 tons). From the position at XT370422, the batteries were to be escorted back to the vicinity of Cu Chi under the control of the 8th Battalion, 6th Artillery. The two batteries of the battalion were air covered by the Battalion Commander (H-13) from the time of their departure from Tay Ninh. Release from attachment was requested and granted at 161600hrs May 66 and the batteries closed into base camp at 1630hrs without incident. Although a command element from this battalion for the three heavy batteries was strongly urged, it was not accepted by 1st Infantry Division Artillery. This required the span of control for 8th Battalion, 6th Artillery of 7 firing batteries. Regardless of the lack of acceptance of the command element, all three attached batteries were visited daily with spare parts, mail, distribution and occasionally ice cream and extra sundry packets. In all due respect to the Commanding Officer, 8th Battalion, 6th Artillery it is this commander's opinion that the operation would have been run more efficiently and smoothly had a command element been provided for the batteries.

Total missions and rounds fired during the operation. were as follows: H & I missions- nine hundred and thirty two (932), registrations- seven (7), anti-personnel missions - one hundred and three (103), anti-installation missions - six (6), and preparatory missions - eight (8).

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Battery "A" expended one thousand and thirty six (1,036) 175mm rounds, and  
Battery "C" one thousand four hundred and thirty eight (1,438) 8" rounds.

(2) On 26 May 1966, one M107 plus 4 APC's and security forces from Battery "A" displaced south of Cu Chi XT604111 for a one day "Turkey Shoot". This added range to the south provided an opportunity for battalion pilots and observers to adjust on targets close to the Cambodian Border that could not be attacked by air because of border restrictions. During the day, 74 rounds were expended. The operation was planned to use four M107's and two FDC's; however, a lack of repair parts allowed only one M107 to participate. Although the operation was perfectly planned and executed, it could have been more profitable with more weapons. Surveillance reports rendered by aerial observers indicated the following damage: three (3) structures destroyed and thirty one (31) structures damaged.

(3) Due to crowded conditions in the Saigon area, the Service Battery was required to move from Tan Son Nhut Air Base (XS797964) by 15 June 1966. A position area in Cu Chi was selected and the battery started a phased movement on 1 June and closed on 5 June. The Personnel Section moved to Long Binh (YT045075) with the 23d Artillery Group Rear in the combined Personnel Section. Although the proximity of the Service Battery to Battalion Headquarters has advantages, the undersigned feels that the proximity of the Service Battery to supplies in the Saigon area far outweighs those advantages.

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(4) On 13 June 1966, an 8" platoon from "C" Battery was attached to 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery and moved to an artillery base at Bao Trai (XT529044) in support of 25th Infantry Division Operations SAMTL FE and FRESNO. The heavy artillery was used mostly in support of the 25th ARVN Division during these operations. On 23 June 1966, one M107 was added to the artillery base to destroy VC targets far to the south and along the Cambodian Border. The battery closed back into base camp at 281700hrs June 1966. A total of six hundred and fifty five (655) 8" and seventy five (75) 175mm rounds had been expended in support of the operations.

(5) During the latter part of May 66, the battalion was alerted to the possibility of sending a composite battery to Xuan Loc (YT466090). By 15 June 1966 the position for the battery had not been prepared by ARVN Engineers as per agreement between higher headquarters (i.e. gun pads and berms were not complete). Thus the battery was held up on its move. By 22 June however the 173d Airborne Brigade was planning Operation YORKTOWN south of Xuan Loc wherein heavy artillery support was desired. Hence Battery "A" (2 M107's and 2 M110's) departed on 22 June 1966 and closed near Bion Hoa (YT061119) that evening less tracks. At approximately 230100hrs the tracks that had held up at Tan Son Nhut AFB moved and closed with the battery and at 230700hrs June the battery moved to Xuan Loc (YT465085). Security was provided by the 173d Airborne Brigade; however, the Battalion Commander, in an H-13, covered the entire closure into position. The move was executed without incident.

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Since the gun pads were not prepared, the pieces were positioned elsewhere within the battery position; thereby allowing ARVN Engineers space to continue this work. The pads had not been completed as of this report and Engineer assistance from 18th Engineer Brigade (US) continues in the area.

On 5 July 1966, the battery received a mission of General Support reinforcing a battery of 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery which was attached to 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division that was supporting an operation in the Xuan Loc area. It must be pointed out at this time battalion liaison officers were required at 10th and 25th ARVN Division Headquarters, 173d Airborne Brigade and 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. The TO&E authorizes one Liaison Officer.

(6) On 19 July 1966, the battalion was alerted to send the Meteorological Section to Mui Dat (YS427668) on 22 July 1966. The purpose of the displacement was to participate in a II Field Force Vietnam Artillery Meteorological Survey being conducted within the III ARVN CTZ. The study will be completed on or about 4 August 1966 and the section should return to base camp on 5 August 1966.

(7) At approximately 261845hrs July the battalion base camp came under mortar attack. Several rounds, later identified as 75RR and 82MM, fell into the area; however, there were no injuries or material damage. At 270515hrs July 1966, the base camp again came under mortar attack.

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Material damage was minor however six casualties were sustained of which two were serious.

(8) Total number of missions and rounds expended during this reporting period:

a. The following missions were fired: Eighty one (81) will adjust, fifteen (15) destruction, sixty (60) registrations, one hundred and twenty (120) special, two hundred and seven (207) anti-personnel, seventeen (17) anti-installation, three (3) TOT's, twenty one (21) preparatory fires, two (2) SPAR, four (4) anti-equipment, one (1) calibration and five thousand four hundred and fifty five (5,455) H & I missions.

b. Total rounds fired during this period included Battery "A" three thousand and eighty seven (3,087) 175mm rounds and one thousand and eighteen (1,018) 8" howitzer rounds; Battery "B", two thousand eight hundred and forty seven (2,847) 175mm rounds; and Battery "C", five hundred and twenty three (523) 175mm rounds and four thousand and ninety eight (4,098) 8" howitzer rounds. For the battalion, six thousand four hundred and fifty seven (6,457) 175mm rounds and five thousand one hundred and sixteen (5,116) 8" howitzer rounds. On 30 June the Commanding Officer, 23d Artillery Group fired the 25,000th round of heavy artillery fired by this battalion in Vietnam.

(9) The position of the battalion at the end of the reporting period was as follows:

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## BATTERY

## LOCATION

HQ	Cu Chi (XT644148)
A	Xuan Loc (YT465085) (2-M107's and 2-M110's)
B	Lai Khe (XT758371) (4-M107's)
C	Cu Chi (XT645147) (2-M107's and 2-M110's)
SVC	Cu Chi (XT640146)

(10) Problem Areas: Shared artillery frequencies continue to be a major problem. In July the Battalion Command Net was shared with Aircraft Control for the 1st Infantry Division!

### f. Administration/Logistics

#### (1) Transportation:

a. Utilization of Roads: Resupply by road increased during the reporting period. Ammunition resupply convoys to Battery "B's" location, Lai Khe, were conducted monthly. Arrangements to place vehicles in these convoys were coordinated with 23d Artillery Group and Transportation Office, 1st Infantry Division. Additional vehicles are requested from 23d Artillery Group and if they cannot meet the requirement, the request is sent to 1st Logistical Command. Resupply convoys to Battery "A" are run in conjunction with major units stationed in the Xuan Loc area.

b. Utilization of Rail: Rail transportation was used by this battalion for the first time since arriving in country. Bulk quantities of Class III supplies were delivered to the "A" Battery position (Xuan Loc) and arrangements are being made for the continuance of this means of transport.

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(c) Utilization of Aircraft: Air resupply of Class I supplies to Battery "A" was established on a fixed schedule. Ration requests are submitted to Ration Breakdown, 1st Logistical Command and that headquarters insures delivery of Class I supplies to Battery "A" on a 2-2-3 cycle. Organic aircraft were used during the period to transport small "priority" items to the firing batteries on operations as well as in base camps.

## (2) MAINTENANCE, CARE AND REPAIR OF EQUIPMENT:

a. Availability of critical repair parts for the M107's and M110's greatly improved during this reporting period, however a 5-7 day down time for parts has been common and is considered inadequate. Support maintenance units stock many of these critical items, thereby reducing maintenance down time for these weapons.

b. During the first week of July 1966 a new serviceability criteria for 175mm gun breech assemblies was announced. This criteria deadlined seven of our M107's; however, new assemblies were quickly received and all guns were functioning by 13 July 1966.

c. This unit presently receives maintenance and repair parts support from several units. Batteries "A" and "B" receive support from contact teams from the 185th Ordnance Battalion. However, both units have back up maintenance support units. Battery "B" receives backup support from a Forward Support Company, 701st Maintenance Battalion, 1st Infantry Division and Battery "A" receives support from 185th Maintenance Battalion. Battalion minus receives maintenance and repair parts support from the 725th Maintenance Battalion, 25th Infantry Division; however,

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the 185th Maintenance Battalion will send contact teams to this location when requested.

d. In May 1966 a team of Ordnance Technicians Automotive Command, Detroit, Michigan spent approximately three days per battery assisting them with maintenance problems. This visit proved to be very beneficial because they expedited the receipt of many needed critical items for the M107's and M110's.

e. On 2 June 1966 two new M110's were issued to Battery "C". The "old" M110's will become ordnance floats and will be issued to units when a major assembly would cause a gun to be deadlined for an unusually long period. With the increase of repair parts and the availability of ordnance floats, maintenance down time on the M107's and M110's should be greatly reduced.

f. On 9 June the M107 was received to replace the one that exploded on 3 April. This delay of more than two months is considered completely unsatisfactory!

g. Maintenance Down Time for M107's and M110's during the reporting period:

(1) 175mm Maintenance Down Time:

- (a) Possible Days: 663
- (b) Non Available Days: 99
- (c) Deadline rate: 15%

(2) 8" Howitzer Maintenance Down Times

- (a) Possible Days: 368

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(b) Non Available Days: 32

(c) Deadline Ratio: 9%

(3) The following parts for both weapon systems  
have caused the greatest amount of down time:

(a) Loader Rammer

(b) Elevating Mechanism

(c) Lockout System

(d) Fan Belts

(e) Spade Cylinders

(f) Recoil System

(g) Breech Assemblies (175mm Gun)

(h) Panoramic Sights, M15

h. During the reporting period the Commander stated to many visitors including the Commanding General, Weapons Command and Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command that the M107 system has not been responsive only because of a lack of repair parts. This system can accomplish its mission but the expeditious resupply of repair parts has been unsatisfactory!

3. ADMINISTRATION OF SUPPLY: The S-4 continues to provide administrative supervision, staff planning and supervision of supply operations within the battalion.

4. SUPPLY OPERATIONS:

a. The following items of equipment, considered combat essential, were received during the reporting period:

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- (1) New series radio sets, AN/PRC-125, AN/VRC-46 and AN/VRC-47.
  - (2) Partial issue of Radio Set, Control Groups, AN/GRA-39. (Authorized 22 each and received 15).
  - (3) Truck, 2½ ton, M35A2. (Received 2 and 2 are due out. These are replacements for those previously turned in as unserviceable).
  - (4) Antenna Group, AN/GRC-50.
  - (5) Gun, 175mm, M107 (Replacement for item damaged by explosion).
  - (6) Howitzer, 8", M10, 2oa (Replaced by support maintenance).
- b. The following items of equipment, considered combat essential, were not received during the reporting period:
- (1) Panoramic Telescope, M15.
  - (2) Radio Set, Control Group, AN/GRA-39.
  - (3) Truck, Wrecker, 5 ton, M543.
  - (4) Tank, Truck, Fuel Servicing, 2½ ton.
  - (5) Truck, Cargo, 5 ton, M54A2 (one replacement for unserviceable vehicle).
  - (6) Truck, Cargo, 2½ M35A2 (two replacements for unserviceable vehicles).
  - (7) Installation Unit, AN/VRC-46, for recovery Vehicle, M38.
  - (8) Intercom Set, AN/UIC, for recovery vehicle, M38.

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5. AMMUNITION

a. Ammunition for Batteries "A" and "B" is drawn from Long Binh ASP and is delivered by road to the batteries. Ammunition for Battery "C" is drawn from the Long Binh ASP and 25th Infantry Division ASP. Pick up and delivery is made by organic transportation.

b. Problems Areas:

(a) M107's and M110's have been unnecessarily dead-lined because of the nonavailability of repair and replacement parts.

(b) Maintenance and upkeep of generators continue to be major problems that can best be solved by command emphasis.

f. Aviation

(1) During this period, the battalion had three aircraft assigned, two O1-D observation aircraft and one OH-13S observation helicopter. Flying times for the aircraft were as follows:

<u>TYPE AIRCRAFT</u> & <u>TAIL NUMBER</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>	<u>JULY</u>
O1D 57-2925	89	59	71
O1D 57-2963	73	59	76
OH-13S 64-15398	62	62	0 (Down for repair parts)

(2) During May and June the O-1 type aircraft were used extensively for surveillance and artillery adjustment. During July, the O-1 aircraft performed additional administrative flights because the OH-13S helicopter was EDP in field maintenance (605th DSU) from the first of July to the end of the reporting period.

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(3) Field maintenance down time for period is broken down  
as follows:

<u>TYPE AIRCRAFT &amp; TAIL NUMBER</u>	<u>FIELD MAINTENANCE DOWN TIME</u>
01D 57-2925	175 hrs*
01D 57-2963	122 hrs*
OH-13S 64-15398	744 hrs**

\* Repair of bullet damage to the U-1 aircraft, technical inspections and sheet metal work following periodic inspections accounted for the majority of maintenance down time.

\*\* Non-availability of repair parts kept the helicopter from being flyable during the month of July.

## g. Civic Actions:

(1) The battalion supported MED CAP II Programs conducted in the Hau Nghia Province throughout the reporting period. The Battalion Surgeon in concert with the 25th Infantry Division Artillery Surgeon, conducted weekly sick calls for the local populace. Average patient load was 80 per sick call.

(2) Personnel from Headquarters and "C" Batteries, continued the program of construction at the Bao Ha School, Hau Nghia Province. Personnel constructed fences and gates around the school as part of the project of getting the school ready for the new school session. In addition swings, slides and teeter totters have been constructed and are being positioned at the school.

(3) Personnel from the battalion contributed soap and

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candy to villages in Huu Nghia Province as part of the 25th Infantry Division Independence Day Activities. Over \$200.00 was collected and presented to the 25th Infantry Division Chaplain to purchase those items. Classes and training aids are now being prepared to instruct the local villagers on personal hygiene using Battalion Interpreters.

(4) The battalion presented four sewing machines, received from the United States, to the Tan An Hoi Grammar School for the use of the local villagers. The gift also included machine attachments. Sewing classes will be given to insure the villagers obtain the maximum benefit from the machines.

(5) In support of the "War on Inflation" within the Republic of Vietnam, personnel in Xuan Loc avoid buying items off the local economy. Those items that are necessary are purchased only at a price determined to be noninflationary by the local Vietnamese Leaders and Advisors to 10th ARVN Division.

(6) The battalion contributed 100% to a fund to establish the Dong Nai Orphanage.

## SECTION 2

1. (C) Section 2, Part I, Observation (Lessons Learned).

a. Personnel: None.

b. Operations

(1) Movement of Ammunition During the Rainy Season.

(a) Item: Movement of ammunition.

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(b) Discussion: While participating in Operation

"BIRMINGHAM", batteries had difficulty moving ammunition with 5 ton wheeled vehicles. Artillery bases were frequently established in rice paddies and the wheeled vehicles were often stuck when leaving the primary road network.

(c) Observation: Ammunition, during the rainy season, should be hauled by APC's, towing trailers, rather than wheeled vehicles.

(2) Correct Selection of Targets.

(a) Item: Priority of Targets.

(b) Discussion: On a recent operation, a battery fire direction center gave a cease fire on a will adjust mission to engage a live target. Having plotted the coordinates for the target, it was determined that it was out of range.

(c) Observation: The lesson relearned was to plot the fire capability upon occupation of position.

(3) Need for continued training on subjects peculiar to Guerilla Warfare.

(a) Item: Continued training is necessary on subjects peculiar to Guerilla Warfare and not practiced each day.

(b) Discussion: Subjects such as active and passive defense measures, convoy control and discipline, escape and evasion are of particular importance. When the guerilla strikes it is usually a well planned action, thus friendly responses must be immediate and effective and

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requires continued emphasis.

(c) Observation: Control of subject material for training will vary according to the locality and must be retained at unit level.

d. Intelligence: None.

e. Logistics: None.

f. Other: None.

2. (C) Section 2, Part II, Recommendations.

a. A Target Analysis Center be formed to analyze intelligence information from all sources. Data gathered, if disseminated rapidly, could be effectively utilized for the timely programming of artillery fires.

b. Two additional 10 KW generators be issued expeditiously.

c. That HU1 helicopters be made available at least twice weekly for a four hour period to fulfill the many requirements for movement of supplies, repair parts and to include replacements, promotion boards, briefing teams, etc.

d. PLL for the M107's and M10's should be authorized at both battalion and battery level.

e. Since the majority of the battalion's fire missions are H & I to take advantage of the 175mm weapons range, it is recommended to increase the H & I fires during daylight hours in areas where troops are not operating so as to discourage movement on trails and roads and also discourage the VC from planting and harvesting crops. By so doing, the denial of areas to VC outside the TAOR's should be enhanced.

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*L. L. Decorrevont*

L. L. DECORREVONT  
LTC, Artillery  
Commanding

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AVCE-C (10 Aug 66) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,  
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HEADQUARTERS, 23D ARTILLERY GROUP, APO 96289, US Forces, 13 August 1966

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery, APO US Forces 96227

1. (U) The quarterly report submitted by the 2nd Battalion, 32nd Artillery is adequate.

2. (U) Ref Section 2, part II, para 2a. Rapid collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence is a necessity in counter insurgency warfare. Refinements of existing procedures utilizing present resources should decrease response time from target detection to target engagement.

3. (U) Ref Section 2, part II, para 2b. Concur. While the Group has received additional generators, there is still a shortage of 10 KW generators.

4. (U) Ref Section 2, part II, para 2c. A HU-1D helicopter is already being requested for the Group and, if approved, will be made available to subordinate units on an as needed and equitable basis.

5. (U) Ref Section 2, part II, para 2d. AR 735-35 Section VI para 6-3 allows the PLL to be located at the battery level. It is not felt that the PLL need be located at both levels. This Headquarters will review the PLL status of this unit in the near future.

6. (U) Ref Section 2, part II, para 2e. H and I scheduling should be on a 24 hour basis and in accordance with the tactical situation. If intelligence reveals increased movement of VC in the daytime then H and I's scheduling should be adjusted accordingly.

7. (U) This page regraded UNCLASSIFIED when separated from basic document.

THOMAS H. SAYES  
Colonel, Artillery  
Commanding

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED When Separated  
From CLASSIFIED Inclosure

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